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ARTICLES
IMPROVING EXPERT TESTIMONY
Jack B. Weinstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Our real world outside the ivory towers of academia and the
courts grows more and more complex. The law's use of expert wit-
nesses has expanded at a pace reflective of society's reliance on
specialized knowledge. Hardly a case of importance is tried today
in the federal courts without the involvement of a number of ex-
pert witnesses.
While our problems in the use of experts at trial have increased,
the evidentiary solutions have not crystallized. To the extent that
there are any ready answers, they tend to lie in the field of proce-
dure and in the possibility of controlling experts through profes-
sional self-regulation and supervision by private associations and
government.
Even more urgent in reducing the difficulties posed by the use of
experts is the need to reconsider substantive law. Are we demand-
ing more from experts than they can give? Illustrative of this con-
cern are the problem of the insanity defense in criminal cases and
the broad issue of compensation for toxic tort injury.
The very flexibility of the current rules regulating expert testi-
mony requires judges to exercise more control in some cases. Inter-
vention and activism here do not raise the same theoreti-
cal problems that have led to criticism of managerial1 and
* Chief Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York; Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Law, Columbia University. I am grateful for the assistance of Arieh Zak, J.D., 1985,
Columbia University, in preparing this article. I have generally kept footnotes to a minimum
since my views are expanded upon with considerable citation elsewhere. See J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE (1985).
1. See, e.g., Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 424-26 (1982); E. Elliott,
Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure (Oct. 3, 1985) (unpublished; one of a
series of papers for the Yale Law School Program in Civil Liability). But see Flanders, Blind
Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505 (1984); McGovern, To-
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settling2 judges. In run-of-the-mill cases, the attorneys will settle
or try their cases without the need for substantial court interven-
tion. But there are cases where the testimony of experts is critical
and the risk of misleading the trier substantial; here more inter-
vention and control by the judge is warranted.
A. Common Law History
The need for expert assistance is not unique to our times. Ex-
perts have been at home in common law courts for a long time. In
1353, for example, surgeons were called to testify on the question
whether a wound amounted to mayhem 3-a mixed question of law
and fact. In a fifteenth century case, grammarians were required to
testify about the meaning of a Latin word.
In this early period, expert witnesses were considered to be as-
sistants of the court. By the seventeenth century, experts began to
be treated as witnesses, and by the eighteenth, the familiar com-
mon law rules governing the opinion testimony of experts began to
emerge.
At one stage of the common law's development, the notion of an
expert was apparently a very broad one, referring not only to tech-
nical experts but also to all people who had opinions based on spe-
cialized knowledge of some sort-including the observations of
those who would today be characterized as lay witnesses. As late as
last century, Greenleaf and others tended to test all opin-
ion-whether lay or expert in the modern sense-by the criterion
of helpfulness to the trier. Greenleaf was thus able to make the
following statement in the same paragraph in which he discusses
scientific testimony: "In an action for breach of a promise to
marry, a person accustomed to observe the mutual deportment of
the parties, may give in evidence his opinion upon the question,
ward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation,-U. CHI. L. REv.-(1986).
2. See Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984); E. Elliott, supra note 1,
at 19-20; H.L. Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined (Mar. 12, 1986) (unpublished lec-
ture given at Fourth Annual Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub Memorial Lecture, Rutgers
School of Law). But cf., e.g., Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case
Management, Two-Stage Discoiiry Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 277 (1985). Much of the criticism of excessive management by judges
is unfounded and based on inadequate-or no-field work. Systematic observation of what
the judges and magistrates are in fact doing would, I believe, mute some of the criticism.
The bar appears to favor early intervention by the court to assist in settlement. See W.
Brazil, Settling Civil Suits (1985).
3. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIsToRY oi ENGLISH LAW 212 (1926).
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whether they were attached to each other."' 4 Even Wigmore in his
first edition emphasized that it was "a mistake to think of some
witnesses as experts and others as non-experts."'5 Only later came
the more elegant analysis distinguishing between expert and non-
expert on the basis of the trier's need for a generalized hypothesis
not part of common knowledge in making inferences from the ob-
servable data.
When addressing the issue of a particular expert witness's quali-
fications, the law then recognized that different qualifications
should be required of different kinds of experts. The accepted rule
of law was that "[t]he question in each instance is whether the
particular witness is fitted as to the matter in hand. On many
points the nature of the subject is such that a scientific training is
indispensable; but [to reach this result courts] simply apply the
general principle and require the particular sort of experience
which fits the witness to acquire knowledge on the particular mat-
ter."' In addition to applying a sort of sliding scale in addressing
the qualification issue, the law was fairly lenient on the question of
the qualifications of even a technical witness. It was fairly clear, for
example, that a general practitioner could testify on medical issues
requiring specialists' knowledge.7
B. Limits on Expert Testimony under Modern Common Law
The common law did impose some limits on expert witnesses.
Among these was the rule preventing them from stating their opin-
ion on the ultimate issue of fact.8
The required practice of basing expert opinions on hypothetical
fact patterns was theoretically impeccable. It gave the courts ac-
cess to the expert's general knowledge and evidential hypothesis,
but allowed the jury to make the findings of fact predicate to con-
clusions in the expert line of proof. As a practical matter, however,
the hypothetical often resulted in so chopping up the expert's
opinion that it was of little value. It often made it impossible for
experts to transmit their knowledge to a trier of fact in a helpful
4. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 440 (3d ed. 1846 & 16th ed.
1899).
5. 1 J. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 555, at 668 (1904) (emphasis in
original).
6. Id. § 556, at 669-70.
7. Id. § 569, at 682.
8. S. GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 595.
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way. It led to the well-known abuses of extensive mid-trial collo-
quies, interruptions and summations.
Limits on the experts' use of the kind of hearsay they normally
relied upon, the unworkable "no expert opinion on an expert opin-
ion rule," and limits on the use of treatises, both as evidence-in-
chief and to attack credibility, added to the courts' difficulties in
obtaining useful specialized information. Preventing experts from
basing their opinions on information they gained as observers at
trial10 also had an inhibiting effect. And, of course, some courts
would have been aghast at the current practice of the trier reading
the experts' written reports. Overall, the common law system that
prevailed earlier this century provided a theoretically sound ap-
proach to the admissibility of expert testimony that in practice was
often stilted, awkward and unduly restrictive.
As our era approached, evidence law on experts took a further
restrictive turn. In Frye v. United States,"' the United States Cir-
cuit Court for the District of Columbia grafted a new restriction
onto the old common law rules. In a case involving the admissibil-
ity of the results obtained from a rudimentary lie detector test, the
court made a sound decision to exclude the evidence. Its statement
of principle was more troubling: "[W]hile courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."' 2 Whatever
the "general acceptance" test meant, it became clear that the Frye
rule might block the introduction of important and useful
testimony.13
9. State v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633 (1942).
10. See J. WEINSTEIN, J. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 381 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as CASEBOOK].
11. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
12. Id. at 1014. Section 108 of S. 1999, recently introduced in the Senate, employs a simi-
lar test, requiring "support in peer-reviewed scientific or medical studies." S. 1999, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 108 (1985).
13. See Goodman & Zak, The Heat is On: Thermograms as Evidence Under the Frye
Standard, 8 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 13 (1986).
[Vol. 20:473
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II. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A. Eliminating Restrictions
As technology advanced and expert testimony became more im-
portant in the resolution of increasingly complex litigation, unnec-
essary impediments became unacceptable. Following a good deal of
sensible case law and practice that loosened up common law re-
strictions, the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted. Substi-
tuted for the common law rules was a broadly discretionary set of
guides embodied in such Rules as 102,14 403,15 702 through 706,16
and 803(18). 17
We all breathed a great sigh of relief. That evidence scholars had
long been seeking had now come to pass.18 Soon, however, as with
many reforms, the secondary effects became apparent, leading
many to question whether we had not created more difficult
problems than the ones we had solved. We are reminded of Macau-
lay's retort to a plea for his support of parliamentary reform: "Re-
form, reform, don't speak to me of reform. We're in enough trouble
already."
Most important of the new rules is Rule 702, which provides that
expert testimony is admissible "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue."' 9 The breadth of the "as-
14. Rule 102 provides that the rules are to be construed "to secure fairness in administra-
tion, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and develop-
ment of the law of evidence to the end that truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined." FED. R. EVID. 102.
15. This rule allows for exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the dangers of prejudice, confusion, misleading the jury, or waste of
time. FED. R. EVID. 403.
16. These rules concern expert testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702-06.
17. Rule 803(18) provides standards for the use of learned treatises. FED. R. EVID. 803(18).
18. The Federal Rules have been adopted in the majority of states with minor modifica-
tions. Their adoption currently is being considered in Virginia, requiring resolution of the
question whether the legislature or the courts should adopt them. See VA. R. ED. (Approved
Committee Draft 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED V& RULES]. That jurisdictional dis-
pute arose in a number of other states, including Florida and Ohio, and invariably has been
resolved by good sense and compromise.
19. Proposed Va. Rule 702 adds the word "reliable" before "scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge." See PROPOSED VA. RULES, supra note 18, Rule 702. The effect of this
change is uncertain, but it would seem to make no changes in the Federal Rule as applied
since it restates the balancing required by FED. R. EVID. 403. It does not represent adoption
of the Frye doctrine, which is explicitly rejected in the Comment to Proposed Va. Rule 702.
See id. comment.
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sistance to the trier of fact" standard has encouraged courts to
abandon the Frye standard even though the Federal Rules did not
expressly reject it.
In place of Frye, courts are increasingly adopting a balancing
test to determine admissibility of expert testimony.20 According to
one formulation of the balancing test, Rule 702 requires that a dis-
trict court
conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1) the soundness and re-
liability of the process or technique used in generating the evidence,
(2) the possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm,
confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection be-
tween the scientific research or test result to be presented, and par-
ticular disputed factual issues in the case.21
By focusing not only on the reliability of the proposed evidence
but also on the jury's probable response to it, this test authorizes
the admission of various types of novel expert testimony that in
theory might not have been admitted under the Frye doctrine
strictly applied because the experts lacked the requisite scientific
pedigree.22 In practice, however, courts today all tend to admit the
same evidence whether or not they purport to apply the Frye
standard.
The new test has also led to the admission of opinions that are
so nontechnical that they are best described as "quasi-expert,"
rather than expert, testimony. It has led to a blurring of the line
20. Compare Berger, A Relevancy Approach to Novel Scientific Evidence, 26 Jurimetrics
Journal of Law 245 (1986) (advocating incorporation of balancing test into Rule 702) with
Starrs, Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal
Evidence Rule 702, 26 Jurimetrics Journal of Law 249 (1986) (advocating incorporation of
Frye standard into Rule 702).
21. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); see also United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Sebetich, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 384 (3d Cir. 1986) (testi-
mony on eyewitness identification); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112
(8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986) (hypnotically enhanced testimony);
United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1985) (comparison of impressions inside de-
fendant's shoes with footprints at scene of crime); United States v. Metzger, 778 F.2d 1195
(6th Cir. 1985) (thin-layer chromatography used to prove presence of explosive); see also
Abney, Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Identification, CASE & COM., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at
26; DePaul, The Rape Trauma Syndrome: New Weapon for Prosecutors, NAT'L L. J., Oct.
28, 1985, at 1; Price, Battered- Woman Syndrome: A Defense Begins to Emerge, N.Y. L. J.,
Dec. 2, 1985, at 3; Martin, Expert Opinion on Eyewitness Testimony, N.Y. L. J., Feb. 2,
1986, at 1.
23. See United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1985) (police officer, testifying as
[Vol. 20:473
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between expert testimony and lay testimony, with some courts us-
ing Rule 701-controlling the testimony of non-expert observ-
ers-to admit testimony that others would admit under Rule 702.4
We seem to be returning to a flexible approach to "expert" testi-
mony that is closer to what Greenleaf seems to have had in mind.
An almost unbroken continuum of admissible opinions of layper-
sons, conventional experts, and new types of experts is the result.
No one can rightly object to this opening up of sources of infor-
mation. As long as the balancing is properly done, it puts before
the jury testimony that may assist it in reaching the proper result
on the merits.
The wise judge using these new rules, along with Rule 403, can
control eveything and prevent prejudice. Who, however, will know
who is-or will trust-the wise judge? Certainly not I, who looks
each morning in the mirror at an aging head being shaved and
knows how almost inexhaustible are its reserves of ignorance and
bias.
The Federal Rules of Evidence made a number of other impor-
tant liberalizing changes. Rule 703 provides that the facts or data
on which an expert bases his opinion need not be admissible if
they are of a type "reasonably relied upon by experts in the partic-
ular field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject. ' 2 By
an expert on the operation of street drug dealers, stated that in his opinion the defendant
was a "steerer" whose job it was to screen prospective purchasers; held admissible under
Rule 702).
24. See Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985) (litigator who had some famili-
arity with securities laws' disclosure requirements testified as to adequacy of disclosures in
an offering memorandum; held admissible under Rule 701); Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 768
F.2d 1303 (11th Cir. 1985) (patients treated at Bahamian cancer clinic with a treatment not
approved by U.S. government or proven effective allowed to testify under Rule 701 that the
treatment helped improve their condition); Ernst v. Ace Motor Sales, 550 F. Supp. 1220
(E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1983) (police officer who arrived at scene some
time after accident could testify to point of impact as either lay or expert witness).
Where the lay witness has no specialized knowledge, however, his opinion should be ex-
cluded. See United States v. Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1985) (testimony of doctors
and nurses regarding whether defendant intended to issue prescriptions for legitimate medi-
cal reasons excluded where witnesses had not observed treatment of patients or writing of
prescriptions).
25. The language of the proposed Virginia Rule is slightly different, but its effect is the
same as that of the Federal Rule. See PROPOSED VA. RULES, supra note 18, Rule 703.
The Virginia proposals, even more than the Federal Rules, stress the responsibility of the
trial judge to require reliability and trustworthiness as a basis for admissibility of expert
testimony.
Virginia Rule 703 provides the guidance to trial judges not found in other rules. It
requires only that facts or data not otherwise admissible in evidence be the kind re-
19861
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allowing experts to rely on hearsay-provided the hearsay is suffi-
ciently trustworthy-Rule 703 simplifies the expert witness's task,
allowing him to function in court in much the same way he does
outside of court.26 Who decides if experts reasonably rely on such
hearsay? Why, the know-it-all wise judge, who may or may not
confirm his view by asking the expert, "Other experts in the field
reasonably rely on the hearsay you rely on Doctor, isn't that so?"
Rule 704 abolished the old rule against expert testimony on the
ultimate issue of fact. In practice the abolition has had a limited
impact since the courts prefer to keep the expert's opinion at least
one step removed from the material proposition to be proved, leav-
ing to the jury the final step.2 s
Other rules that do not deal directly with expert witnesses have
nonetheless had the effect of increasing the utility and impact of
lied upon by experts in the particular area of expertise for the use that is to be made
of them at trial. Unless experts do rely on facts or data outside of court, there is no
reason to consider them reliable enough to be used in court. Nothing in the rule re-
quires a proponent of expert testimony to prove that in previous cases experts have
used facts or data in the way the proponent asks the expert to use them. The rule
requires only that the expert use facts or data in the manner that they are used
outside of court by other experts who consider the facts or data as reliable when used
in this manner.
PROPOSED VA. RULES, supra note 18, Rule 703 comment.
26. In Delaware v. Fensterer, 106 S. Ct. 292 (1985), the Supreme Court held that admis-
sion of a prosecution expert's testimony despite his inability to recall the basis for his opin-
ion did not violate defendant's sixth amendment confrontation right.
27. See, e.g., Schaffter v. Ward, 17 Ohio St. 3d 79, 477 N.E.2d 1116 (1985) (in case involv-
ing two-car collision, trial court's verdict reversed because court improperly excluded testi-
mony of plaintiff's mechanical engineer regarding point of impact). But see United States v.
Affieck, 776 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985) (testimony of "memory expert" excluded as un-
helpful because within knowledge of jury); United States v. Arenal, 768 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.
1985) (police officer's testimony that all cocaine at issue probably had a common source
since it was all cut with same agent excluded under Rule 702 as unhelpful because within
knowledge of jury); State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986) (testimony that clildren
rarely lie about sexual abuse excluded as within common knowledge of jurors); State v. Bu-
ell, 22 Ohio St. 3d 124, 489 N.E.2d 795 (1986) (testimony of expert on credibility of individ-
ual eyewitnesses testifying on identification excluded as within common experience of
jurors).
In contrast to the issue of usurpation of the role of the jury is the issue of usurpation of
the role of the judge, which arises in accounting and tax cases among others, in which law-
yers provide testimony combining law and fact. See 3 J. WEINSTmIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 704[02], at 704-15 & n.13 (1985) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE].
28. This is the effect of proposed alternative 1 of the Virginia Rule which is written some-
what more restrictively than the Federal Rule. See PROPOSED VA. RULES, supra note 18,
Rule 704. Alternative 2 is virtually the same as the Federal Rule. See id.
Proposed Va. Rule 705 on "Disclosure of Facts or Data" by the expert also increases court
control. See id. Rule 705.
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expert testimony. Rules 801(a), 803(3) and 803(4), relating to hear-
say, allow into evidence much more than heretofore of diagnoses
and treatment. Rules 803(6) and 803(8) provide exceptions to the
hearsay rule for business records and government records and re-
ports. Since these kinds of records often provide the raw data upon
which expert opinions are based, the effect of these exceptions is to
allow expert witnesses to provide the trier with the evidence that
forms the basis for their opinions in those cases where its introduc-
tion may be helpful in proving the case.
The 803(6) and 803(8) exceptions themselves explicitly include
diagnoses and opinions, so that an expert's opinion can theoreti-
cally come in without the expert ever appearing. Of course, tactical
pressures to produce the most persuasive evidence result in most
instances in the use of experts' live testimony rather than their
hearsay reports.
The learned treatise exception, Rule 803(18), and such excep-
tions as 803(17) on market and commercial reports, are also impor-
tant. They make it easier for expert witnesses to educate the trier
about a body of knowledge that may be unfamiliar to the
layperson.
Rule 1006 allows summaries of voluminous data to be introduced
into evidence despite the traditional "best evidence" rule. The fed-
eral rule provides expert witnesses such as accountants and ana-
lysts with an additional convenient and understandable way to
present their data.29
Today it is not uncommon to permit experts to read all or part
of their reports into the record. Many courts will sensibly mark the
reports-prepared for the litigation-in evidence, so that the jury
can study the document and its attendant tables, pictures and dia-
grams. Each juror may be given a copy of the report so that he or
she can follow the testimony and study the report at leisure in the
jury room as any responsible and intelligent layperson would want
to.
Experts sit in court and hear all or part of the testimony. Fre-
quently they base their reports on a summary of the facts the at-
torney has informally given them by telephone or letter.
The Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts have
29. For a discussion of the interplay of Rules 803(6), 803(8), and 1006, see MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d, § 21.446, at 61 n.80 (1985).
1986]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
thus produced an enormous loosening up of the restrictions on the
admission of expert testimony, on its basis, on its form, and on the
effective utilization of such testimony once admitted. This relaxa-
tion was needed to give the trier of fact convenient access to the
reliable technical knowledge that is available in our modern soci-
ety. As might be expected, however, the modification of the old
rules has led to new difficulties.
B. Problems Under the Federal Rules
An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any fac-
tual theory, no matter how frivolous, thus validating the case suffi-
ciently to avoid summary judgment and force the matter to trial.
At the trial itself an expert's testimony can be used to obfuscate
what would otherwise be a simple case. The most tenuous factual
bases are sufficient to produce firm opinions to a high degree of
"medical (or other expert) probability" or even of "certainty." Ju-
ries and judges can be, and sometimes are, misled by the expert-
for-hire.
The possible excesses of the current system already appear to be
generating some dissatisfaction, as evidenced by Congress's recent
passage of new Rule 704(b),3 0 limiting expert testimony on the is-
sue of a criminal defendant's mental state. In part this legislation
demonstrates a revulsion over the battle of experts in insanity de-
fense cases. This rule change seems unwise for the same reasons
that the District of Columbia Circuit's prior attempts to deal with
the issue by case law failed."' But the disquiet of the legislators is
understandable.
New discretionary controls, consonant with the general require-
ments of Rules 102 and 403, may be needed to curb the potential
abuses that have appeared since the adoption of the Rules. 2 But
how can discretion be bridled in a manner predictable and fair?
How can the nonexperts control the experts?
30. The new rule prevents an expert witness testifying on the mental state or condition of
a criminal defendant from stating an opinion or inference on whether the defendant had the
requisite mental constituting an element of or defense to the crime charged. FED. R. EVD.
704(b).
31. See CASEBOOK, supra note 10, at 358-65, 388-94.
32. See generally Carlson, Policing the Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L.
REv.-(1986).
[Vol. 20:473
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C. Procedural Changes
Some courts have begun taking procedural steps to limit or con-
trol expert testimony. The primary actions taken to date involve
supervision of the preparation of expert testimony in the pretrial
stage.
Some local practice, for example, requires each party to identify
the experts that it will use at trial and to provide a summary of
those experts' expected testimony."3 A number of federal judges re-
quire that parties provide a glossary of terms that their experts
will use at the trial.3 4 Intended primarily to assist the reporters to
take testimony accurately, the definition of terms-particularly if
the experts can agree on them-can be used by the judge in pre-
paring for the trial.3 5 While I have not yet tried it, I would be
ready to order that a list of exotic terms with definitions be fur-
nished for each of the jurors as part of his or her notebook in a
complex case.
Joint pretrial meetings between the judge and key expert wit-
nesses are becoming more frequent.3 The presence of each side's
experts at the other side's experiments is also encouraged.3 7 Some
courts require that each side list before trial those learned treatises
admissible under Rule 803(18) and other hearsay that it intends to
rely upon at trial.38
More might be done. The possibilities include the following:
First, further improvements in pretrial procedure should be con-
sidered. The Special Committee on Empirical Data in Legal Deci-
sion Making of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
has made a number of useful recommendations regarding control
33. See PANEL ON STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS, THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURT 362 [hereinafter cited as As-
SESSMENT PANEL].
34. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d § 22.31 (1985).
35. In most instances terminology in the field is sufficiently standard that agreement as to
the definition of terms can be obtained, and the triei will be able to more readily follow the
testimony. In those occasional instances where agreement cannot be reached, a separate
glossary by each side is possible.
36. This is the practice in my court, and discussion of the issue with other judges indi-
cates that other judges do this as well.
37. See Hall v. General Motors Corp., 647 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also Jaffee, Of
Probativity and Probability: Statistics, Scientific Evidence, and the Calculus of Chance at
Trial, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 925, 1077 & n.202 (1985).
38. See, e.g., the standard civil pretrial order, at paragraph 4, and the standard criminal
pretrial order, at paragraph 11, used in my court.
1986]
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of statistical evidence. These include proposals that a party offer-
ing data or data analysis at trial be required, at each stage of dis-
covery, to provide the opposing party with all the underlying
records from which the data were collected;39 that a party offering
data or data analyses at trial make available for conferences with
other parties the personnel that compiled the data;40 that parties
attempt to agree on a database well before trial;41 and that parties
be required to object to their opponent's experts' analysis before
trial.42 In a similar vein, it has been suggested that parties be com-
pelled to reveal the names of all experts they have hired or con-
sulted even if they will not be testifying at trial.43 Amendment of
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to more readily
permit the taking of depositions of non-testifying experts might
also be helpful.44
In limine rulings are increasingly being utilized. They are useful
because they give the parties pretrial directions. Yet some courts
are reluctant to make early rulings lest trial developments lead an
appellate court to conclude that the trial judge was too hasty.
There are some counter-movements to protect the trial court from
reversal on decisions made on less than all the required data. The
Supreme Court's recent Rule 609 ruling in Luce v. United States,45
requiring the defendant to take the stand to preserve his objection
to an in limine ruling, reflects appellate concern for the trial
judge's problems in this context.
The objective of all these suggested modifications to current pro-
cedure is to subject expert testimony to more informed scrutiny by
the opposition's experts and lawyers. Ours is an adversarial system,
and it is therefore quite proper for us to stress sharpening the ad-
versaries' weapons as a means of improving the functioning of the
39. See ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 33, at 360; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION 2d § 21.481, at 83-84 (1985).
40. See ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 33, at 360.
41. See id. at 351; MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d § 33.12 (1985).
42. See ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 33, at 364.
43. See id. at 241; see also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 105 F.R.D. 577
(E.D.N.Y. 1985).
44. Under current laws, discovery of a non-testifying expert may be compelled only upon
a showing of exceptional circumstances. See Kuster v. Harner, 109 F.R.D. 372 (D. Minn.
1986); see also Eliasen v. Hamilton, No. 81 Civ. 123 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 1986) (under FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(4), defendants were entitled to depose a nontestifying expert but could only
inquire into the facts known to and opinions held by the expert prior to the expert's firm
being retained by the plaintiffs).
45. 105 S. Ct. 460 (1984).
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courts. Such reforms avoid some of the hazards of unlimited dis-
cretion which leads to surprise at trial and which requires over-
preparation for eventualities which will not come to pass.
Minitrials and other like devices which permit a preliminary test
of judge and jury reaction to proposed expert testimony may be
useful in complex cases. In bench trials, I from time to time use a
technique of swearing all the experts, seating them at the table to-
gether with counsel and the judge, and engaging them in recorded
colloquy under court directions. These discussions have sometimes
produced a more reasonable attitude by the experts and considera-
ble narrowing of disagreement among them.
The possible use of alternative dispute resolution techniques in
highly technical cases needs to be explored. Arbitration by panels
of technical experts-a latter-day version of the common law's spe-
cial jury-is a possibility that deserves, and seems to be receiving,
favorable attention.46
D. Control by Outside Agencies
The formulation and enforcement of ethical standards for expert
witnesses might- help to curb current abuses.47 The Panel on Sta-
tistical Assessments as Evidence in the Courts of the National
Academy of Sciences is considering two broad recommendations
regarding ethical standards. First, the Panel may recommend "that
professional organizations develop standards for expert witnesses
in legal proceedings who use statistical assessments with respect to
(i) procedures required to ensure reliability in connection with fre-
quently used statistical techniques, (ii) disclosure of methodology,
and (iii) disclosure of aspects that may raise ethical considera-
tions. ' 4  The Panel also is considering a recommendation "that
statistical experts who consult or testify in litigation maintain the
degree of professional autonomy required by independent scientific
research.4 9 Precisely how these recommendations would be imple-
46. See Wessel, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Socioscientific Dispute 1 J. L. &
TECH. 1, 2-3 (1985); NYHART & HEATON, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TASK FORCE WORKSHOP ON
DISPUTES INVOLVING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, IN CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 389
(1982); see also Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury
Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation, 67
VA. L. REV. 887 (1981).
47. See Wessel, supra note 43, at 17-18.
48. ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 33, at 233.
49. Id. at 235.
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mented is unclear.
In addition, it may be helpful to devise some sort of professional
licensing system to certify expert witnesses as being qualified to
testify in a given field. Such a system would be analogous to board
certification of medical specialists. We must be careful, however, to
avoid establishing such high standards for expert witnesses that we
end up in some cases without any witnesses who are qualified
to-or who will-testify.50 This situation existed at one time in the
medical malpractice field. The result was that people with arguably
valid claims for mistreatment could not prove them.
Where a state-licensed expert gives an unprofessional opinion on
the stand, he or she should be subject to state discipline.51 I have
had medical testimony before me that was shockingly suspect. Had
a lawyer given equivalent misleading information I would have
brought the matter to the attention of the disciplinary authority.
What realistic threat exists against doctors? As to unlicensed econ-
omists or statisticians, the matter is now hopeless.
E. Substantive Reform
In some cases the substantive law places too heavy a burden on
experts.5 2 Modification of that law is needed to reduce expert wit-
ness tensions. Eliminating the insanity defense so that only mens
rea would be determined by the jury and insanity, as we now know
it, would be an element of treatment seems to some worth consid-
ering. Many toxic tort damage cases can not reasonably be tried by
asking experts to say that a particular claimant more probably
than not was damaged by a particular chemical from a particular
company.53 We are in the process of considering changes to sub-
50. Cf. Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986) (expert biochemist may testify
regarding effects of phosgene on humans, even though not a medical doctor).
51. Efforts are currently underway in Florida and New York to pass new medical mal-
practice laws providing for disciplining doctors who give unprofessional testimony. See
Tainted Testimony, American Lawyer, Apr. 1986, at 115.
52. A related problem is the tendency of judges in certain types of cases to place too
much reliance on expert testimony instead of relying on their own common sense. This may
be occurring in child custody cases. See Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child
Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1117 (1976).
53. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law'
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849 (1984); Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections
on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1 (1986) [hereinafter cited as
Law's Reaction to Disasters]; Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73
GEO. L.J. 1389 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Role of the Court]. See generally M. GOUGH,
DIOXIN, AGENT ORANGE: THE FAcTs 21-24 (1986) (discussing the difficulties inherent in at-
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stantive-procedural law to meet this kind of problem.
Changing burdens of proof can help to take some pressure off of
expert witnesses. The elimination of contributory negligence as a
complete defense made expert testimony less crucial and created
some room for play in the joints by eliminating the all-or-nothing
effect of a plaintiff's negligence. In this case, the burden of proof
was altered in fact if not in theory. In both the workers' compensa-
tion and social security areas, whether the probability is over fifty
percent or under fifty percent is similarly not critical. In the Agent
Orange cases, it was suggested that the burden of proof could be
altered by looking at the plaintiffs as a class and asking whether
the class as a whole had been harmed in a statistically significant
way, rather than asking whether a particular plaintiff had more
likely than not been harmed by a particular defendant.5 4
Similar approaches to burdens of proof and substantive law may
work in other areas such as the insanity defense and medical mal-
practice. In the case of insanity, expert testimony might be made
less crucial, as already mentioned, by making the insanity issue rel-
evant only to the question of punishment, not guilt or innocence.
In the area of medical malpractice, expert testimony might not
be as critical if we relaxed the plaintiffs burden of proof, while
simultaneously curtailing recoveries for pain and suffering to re-
duce the burden on doctors and malpractice insurers.5 5 A full pro-
gram of medical and disability benefits for all could eliminate
much of this last kind of proof problem. Shifting the emphasis in
malpractice cases, for example, to full social insurance and more
effective state and peer disciplining of doctors would reduce mal-
practice expert problems.5 6 Such proposals for substantive reform
may seem like pie-in-the-sky, but workers' compensation and auto-
mobile no-fault liability statutes indicate that, given the serious is-
tempting to scientifically determine whether a particular substance affects humans).
54. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 816-43 (E.D.N.Y.
1984); THE INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS, CAUSATION AND FINANCIAL COMPENSA-
TION (1986) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS]; Weinstein, Law's Reaction to
Disasters and Role of the Court, supra note 53.
55. A bill recently introduced by Senator Danforth, S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. §
205(d)(2) (1985), follows this approach, allowing a plaintiff to recover limited damages if he
can prove that the defendant's actions caused the incidence of injury to increase by 30%
over the injury rate that would otherwise be expected.
56. See Weinstein, Law's Reaction to Disasters, supra note 53, at 33-36. But see Law
Scope, Bitter Medicine, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1, 1986, at 20 (ABA House of Delegates rejects call
for modification of traditional tort system in medical malpractice cases).
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sue of insurability at a reasonable cost in a number of tort fields
today, substantive-procedural changes are not impossible.
Substantive reform will not solve all problems with experts. The
problems remain endemic and nagging. By far the most difficult
day-to-day frustrations with experts in federal courts arise in eval-
uating social security disability cases. Substantive standards as
well as an unsatisfactory procedure system compound the difficul-
ties. The question of when a particular person should be deemed
disabled and placed on early retirement will not, I think, be made
much easier to answer by any change in the articulated standard.
If adequate control is impossible, it may be necessary to cut
back on expansion of tort liability in a variety of ways. The expan-
sion of substantive bases of liability plus the ease in proof has
helped create what some contend is an almost intolerable situation
in fields such as manufacturers' and municipal liability, toxic torts,
and malpractice. It is certainly time to consider changes in the
substantive law of toxic torts.58
F. Equalization of Poor Persons' Access to Experts
Other reform possibilities will require greater assumption of re-
sponsibility for implementing institutional changes in the courts.
First, there is a problem of redressing the mismatch that results
when one party has access to experts and the other party does
not.59 In Ake v. Oklahoma,0 the Supreme Court held that an indi-
gent criminal defendant is entitled to a state-provided psychiatrist
to examine him and assist in the preparation of an insanity defense
once a threshold showing that such assistance might be helpful is
met.6' And in another case, the Supreme Court ruled that, in a
quasi-criminal paternity suit brought by the state, the state must
pay for blood tests.6 2 But no such assistance is available as of right
57. See Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the Fed-
eral Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897 (1984).
58. See HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 54.
59. See ASSESSMENT PANEL, supra note 33, at 240-43.
60. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). On retrial, Ake was again found guilty; however, the jury in the
second trial sentenced him to life imprisonment, unlike the first jury which sentenced him
to death. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
61. 105 S. Ct. at 1097; cf. SEC v. Whiteman, 613 F. Supp. 48, 49-50 (D.D.C. 1985) (wit-
ness testifying at SEC investigative proceeding has right under Administrative Procedure
Act to assistance of an expert accountant, in addition to assistance of counsel).
62. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981). But see United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841
(5th Cir. 1986) (18 U.S.C. § 3006 (A)(e)(1), which requires court to authorize necessary de-
[Vol. 20:473
IMPROVING EXPERT TESTIMONY
to an indigent litigant in a civil suit.6 3 Some kind of assistance for
indigent litigants, either pro bono or paid for by the government, is
needed.
The Eastern District Litigation Fund was established to help
meet this last problem in my court. It provides some money for
expenses incurred by attorneys appearing pro bono for indigent lit-
igants who need expert testimony. 4 A case that came before me
recently provides an example of how the fund works, and also
demonstrates how essential expert medical testimony can be. The
plaintiff would have been eligible for Social Security benefits based
on her medical condition, which met objective standards of disabil-
ity. She was living on welfare, however, and was being treated at
clinics which, pursuant to their normal practice, would not give her
a satisfactory letter attesting to her disability. I gave the plaintiff
$250 from the litigation fund to enable her to procure an examina-
tion and a letter from a consulting physician.6
Funds such as the one in my district cannot, unfortunately, pro-
vide a complete solution. We need voluntary panels of experts such
as medical doctors, statisticians, and the like, to provide assistance
to the indigent and the lower middle class.
G. Rule 706 and Masters to Assist Courts
Even when both parties can afford experts and have actually
hired them, the issues in some cases may remain so muddled that
the trier of fact needs more even-handed expert assistance. This
problem is one that has been noted before. Learned Hand wrote
about it in 1901,66 when he proposed a solution strikingly similar to
modern Rule 706 which allows the court to appoint its own expert
witnesses.6 7
fense services for indigent defendants, does not require court to appoint expert on defects in
eyewitness identification).
63. Cf. International Woodworkers of America v. Champion Int'l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174
(5th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (fees of expert witnesses are taxable as costs only in the amount
specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1821).
64. A number of federal courts use their attorney admission fees to fund such programs
and to pay the attorneys' expenses.
65. Mason v. Heckler, CV-85-1994 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 1986).
66. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15
HARV. L. REv. 40 (1901).
67. See T. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS (Federal Judicial Center 1986); HEALTH
POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 54, at 10; Jaffee, supra note 37, at 1056 and n.174; MANUAL ON
COMPLEX LITIGATION 2d § 21.5 (1985); Altschuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage
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Judges have generally been reluctant to exercise their Rule 706
powers. The establishment of regional and national panels of ex-
perts in certain areas of expertise needs to be explored. 8 Perhaps
if neutral experts from panels were more readily available, judges
would be more likely to turn to them for help.
Use of technical masters to supervise discovery and preparation
of expert testimony is also possible. We will, I believe, see an ex-
pansion of the use of special masters for this purpose as well as for
settlement and control of general discovery.
An important distinction exists in the relative ability of trial and
appellate courts to induce the production of technical evidence su-
perior to that provided by the parties. Trial courts are able,
through the means just discussed, to develop new evidence. Appel-
late courts, in contrast, must rule on the record developed at trial
and hence are unable, except through limited and sometimes haz-
ardous reliance on judicial notice, to improve upon the parties' at-
tempts to adduce technical evidence.6 9
H. Scientific Studies for Governmental and Other Agencies
A Rule 706 expert is incapable of conducting the expensive stud-
ies frequently needed in modern litigation. For example, in the
swine flu, Agent Orange, DES, toxic shock syndrome, and asbestos
cases, the requisite studies cost millions of dollars, and some took
years to conduct. Where cases involve many plaintiffs or serious
public issues, effective court control requires that scientific studies
of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1848 (1986).
The Virginia Committee saw no need for such a rule "at this time," citing as justification
for its decision the "absence of a tradition of court-appointed experts, combined with the
absence of any strong push for increased use of [such] experts." PROPOSED VA. RULES, supra
note 18, Rule 706 comment.
68. S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), recently introduced by Senator Danforth, pro-
vides for creation of a "National Toxic Health Effects Panel" to conduct scientific inquiries
to resolve issues of causation. See also Trubatch, Informed Judicial Decisionmaking: A
Suggestion for a Judicial Office for Understanding Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 255 (1985).
The Alabama Supreme Court has created a special panel of experts to assist the court in
deciding appeals of public utility ratemaking cases from the public utility commission. See
Weinstein, Warning: Alternative Dispute Resolution May be Dangerous to Your Health,
LITIGATION, Spring 1986, at 5.
69. For a discussion of the difficulties produced by appellate review of scientifically based
administrative decisions, see Davis,, The "Shotgun Wedding" of Science and Law: Risk As-
sessment and Judicial Review, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 67 (1985).
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be conducted as promptly as possible by impartial agencies.70 In
many instances, the Centers for Disease Control will in the normal
course of its work produce acceptable data. Other studies will be
produced by eminent scientists, such as Dr. Selikoff in the asbestos
cases, or by special public funding as in the Agent Orange cases.
Who pays for these studies is a question vital to the proper han-
dling of these matters.
I. Stronger Control by Courts
When all else fails-when neither improved pretrial procedures
nor strengthened ethical codes succeed in terminating litigation in
which one party's position is grounded solely on specious expert
testimony-it may be the task of the judge to do what the adver-
sarial process and professional ethics have failed to do. 71 This is
70. See supra note 68. Speed is of the essence because it may be necessary to delay the
start of trial until the studies are completed.
71. See HEALTH POLICY ANALYSIS, supra note 54, at 26 (endorsing "[r]obust judicial man-
agement of scientific factfinding"). The Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the
Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and
Affordability summed up the problem and suggested a solution, as follows:
Recommendation No. 2: Base causation findings on credible scientific and medical
evidence and opinions.
One of the most pernicious developments in tort law has been the extent to which
causation findings are based on fringe scientific or medical opinions well outside the
mainstream of accepted scientific or medical beliefs. Increasingly, juries are asked to
make difficult decisions about highly complicated issues of science and medicine. Un-
fortunately, the personality and demeanor of expert witnesses often may be more
critical in making such determinations than decades of evolving scientific and medical
investigation and thought.
This problem has resulted in the growing perception that the tort system often is
wholly arbitrary in allocating liability in cases involving difficult issues of science and
medicine. This is a particularly problematic situation in toxic tort and drug liability
cases ....
There are a variety of reasons for this problem:
Many judges do not have the training or inclination to understand complicated
scientific and medical concepts, and are unwilling or unable to devote the time and
energy needed to educate themselves in a complex body of knowledge.
In order not to deprive plaintiffs of their opportunity for compensation, many
courts allow plaintiffs to take whatever scientific or medical views they may
have-however incredible-to the jury.
Many in the legal system do not appreciate how credible scientific and medical
views develop, and the degree to which legal decisionmaking is a poor vehicle for
developing such views.
There often is an understandable frustration with the fact that science and
medicine frequently cannot offer the kind of certainty that the legal decisionmak-
ing mechanisms strive to obtain.
The inability of the tort system to deal credibly with complicated scientific and medi-
cal issues strikes at the very heart of the ability of tort law to deal with the growing
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:473
strong medicine. It impinges on our constitutional notion of the
right to a jury trial. And, as I have already indicated, I share the
concern with placing more power and discretion in the "unlearned"
court.
1. Summary Judgment and Directed Verdicts
The use of summary judgment in highly technical litigation may
have to be expanded to prevent the enormous waste of resources
caused by taking baseless or overwhelmingly strong cases to trial. 2
number of cases involving highly complicated scientific and medical issues. While
there are no easy answers, there are several remedial actions that the Working Group
recommends:
Greater deference must be paid to government agencies and certain private institu-
tions that have devoted decades of attention and millions of dollars to researching
and trying to assess the value of medical and scientific developments. Where such
agencies and institutions have determined that particular products, services or
techniques are safe or socially beneficial, courts should tread very carefully in over-
ruling those judgments through the vehicle of tort law. Lay juries are a very poor
mechanism for second -guessing the judgment of established mainstream scientific
and medical views. Other legal mechanisms for determining those views, such as
rulemaking and licensing proceedings, generally are far superior in making credible
determinations involving complicated issues of science and medicine.
Courts must be more aggressive in determining the credibility of scientific and medi-
cal evidence and opinions before trial, and not simply allow parties to present any
theory to the jury. Appellate courts, in turn, should give trial courts greater latitude
in making such decisions in early stages of litigation. Judges, where feasible, should
receive training on basic methods of scientific, medical and statistical analysis so that
they can make such determinations. If necessary, impartial masters with appropriate
training should be used for this purpose.
Studies and opinions that have not been subjected to the peer review process should
be presumed invalid. Where peer review has taken place, judges (or masters, where
appropriate) should acquaint themselves with the results of such review.
Courts must learn to accept the reality of uncertainty. They must understand that
the fact that some degree of uncertainty always exists does not mean that every sci-
entific or medical belief is as credible as the next. Judges and legislators must not try
to "force" scientific certainty where such certainty simply is not possible. Attempts to
do so through burden-shifting, presumptions or by requiring agencies to issue scien-
tific "findings," simply create a misleading and deceptive gloss of scientific certainty
that in fact does not exist. Ultimately, the legal system must accept the fact that
some things are unknown, and, given existing methods and data, perhaps unknowable
for the foreseeable future.
Id. at 62-64 (footnotes omitted).
72. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The Supreme
Court seems prepared to strengthen the trial judge's hand. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 54
U.S.L.W. 4775 (U.S. June 25, 1986) (defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule
56 where plaintiff is unable to produce evidence on an essential element of his claim); cf.
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985) (requiring deference to trial
court's finding of facts).
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Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a judge can exclude expert
testimony and thus grant summary judgment in one of two ways.
First, there is Rule 703, which allows an expert to base his opinion
on the type of evidence reasonably relied upon by experts in his
field. In some cases, examination of the basis of an expert's opinion
reveals that it is supported by no reliable evidence at all. In such
cases exclusion of the expert's opinion under Rule 703 and a grant
of summary judgment to the opposing party might be appropri-
ate.7 3 In other cases, an expert's opinion is supported by some
credible evidence, but further investigation reveals that there is
other, much more persuasive evidence available which undermines
the expert's opinion and which the expert is ignoring. In these
cases, the court might exclude the expert's testimony either under
Rule 702, as not being helpful to the trier of fact, or under Rule
403, as being likely to mislead the jury.74 Both the reasoning and
the result are much the same regardless of which rule is used.
Judgments notwithstanding the verdict or directed verdicts may
need to be used more. 5 Obviously, summary judgment is more ef-
73. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986) (summary judgment
granted for defendant where no evidence introduced to prove that progesterone manufac-
tured by defendant could cause birth defect); American Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762
F.2d 1569 (11th Cir. 1985) (exclusion of witness and grant of summary judgment in antitrust
case); KN Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 698 P.2d 769 (Colo.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 3489 (1985) (exclusion of witness and grant of partial summary judgment in breach of
contract claim). But see Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 777 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (expert
opinion not accompanied by underlying facts may defeat a summary judgment motion).
74. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1253, 1255-56
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1281-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). Cf. Cairns, The Treatment of Diseases and the War against Cancer, Scl.
Am. Nov. 1985, at 51, 58 (explaining why positive-looking statistics on the effects of chemo-
therapy are misleading). But see Johnson v. United States, 780 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1986)
(exclusion of expert testimony as cumulative under Rule 403 is abuse of discretion where
excluded expert more qualified than those who testified); Backes v. Valspar Corp., 783 F.2d
77 (7th Cir. 1986) (chemist's affidavit on issue of medical causation sufficient to defeat sum-
mary judgment motion).
It should be noted, however, that in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
723 F.2d 238, 284 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986), the Third
Circuit reversed the trial court precisely because the trial court had excluded expert testi-
mony, among other evidence. The Supreme Court did not directly address the admissibility
issue. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1352 (1986).
75. But see Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In denying
defendant judgment notwithstanding the verdict in a case involving long-term skin exposure
to dilute solutions of paraquat, the court states that:
Judges, both trial and appellate, have no special competence to resolve the complex
and refractory causal issues raised by the attempt to link low-level exposure to toxic
chemicals with human disease. On questions such as these, which stand at the fron-
tier of current medical and epidemiological inquiry, if experts are willing to testify
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fective in saving time. Perhaps a form of minitrial combined with
summary judgment needs to be developed.
Rule 11 sanctions may have some impact in limiting the use of
frivolous expert opinions.7" Generally I am not in favor of such pu-
nitive measures, but they will undoubtedly have some effect in re-
ducing abusive use of experts. Would it not be proper to consider
an amendment to Rule 11 enabling the court to impose sanctions
against the expert, as well as against the lawyer and the client?
2. Questions and Comments by the Judge
Federal judges, and some state judges, have extensive power to
comment on the evidence." This power is seldom used. In the area
of scientific proof and expert witnesses, the judge may need to ex-
press the court's views more forcefully to guide the jury. Alterna-
tively, the court can provide the jury with assistance in a some-
what less heavyhanded manner by asking questions of an expert
witness (or by suggesting them to counsel) where it appears to the
court that counsel is doing an inadequate job of bringing out the
salient facts or that the jury is missing the point. Both of these
alternatives imply that the court is capable of commenting or
questioning intelligently.
3. The Role of the Judge in Nonjury Trials
Where a case is tried nonjury, it is desirable, to the extent prac-
ticable, for the judge to become familiar with the scientific back-
ground by reading about the issues and discussing them with the
experts.78 There is some danger here, of course, since a half-in-
formed layman can do more damage than one who suffers from a
that such a link exists, it is for the jury to decide whether to credit such testimony.
Id. at 1534.
76. Rule 11 provides sanctions, including attorneys' fees and costs, for signing of plead-
ings, motions, or other papers which are not well-grounded in fact, warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for a change in the law, or which are interposed for an im-
proper purpose. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
77. See WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENc E, supra note 27, at 200 [07].
78. See Madrigal Audio Laboratories, Inc. v. Cello, Ltd., Nos. 86-7224, 86-7254, slip op. at
5184-85 n.1 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 1986). In this trademark case, the district judge appointed a
special master, stating: "I don't understand anything about the merits of any patent or
trademark case. I'm not about to educate myself in that jungle." Id. The court of appeals
expressed its "firm disagreement with the district judge's concept of his duties," arguing
that the trial judge "is obligated, whenever faced with unfamiliar factual or legal issues,.
to educate himself in those fields . . . ." Id.
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complete lack of knowledge, but also is aware of his or her limita-
tions. Nevertheless, some attempt at self-education and under-
standing is desirable-so long as the parties are made aware of the
judge's efforts and can provide assistance. Thus, it would be appro-
priate for the judge to request the parties to provide a reading list.
It would also be proper to require the parties to allow the judge to
observe experiments or other relevant happenings.
An excellent illustration of enlightened judicial practice was pro-
vided by Judge Finesilver in the swine flu cases. He was assigned
to try all such cases in each of the district courts in his circuit.
During the course of a year, he settled or tried over one hundred
cases, attaining expertise in the process by listening to many ex-
pert witnesses on both sides and by studying all of the literature.
In addition to his readings, he attended a course dealing with re-
lated problems in the local medical school, enabling him to better
understand the scientific issues and terminology.
In Virginia, Judge Robert Merhige's grasp of uranium technol-
ogy and economics undoubtedly enabled him to help settle the dif-
ficult Westinghouse case.80 His knowledge of the medical problems
will be of great assistance to the parties in his management of the
A.H. Robins litigation and bankruptcy.
Passivity of the court is no virtue when serious scientific ques-
tions of more than passing importance are involved. The court
owes an obligation to the parties, to society, and to itself to assist
in obtaining the best possible answers to the scientific questions
before it."" That will mean forcing the parties to gather and pre-
79. This device was used by Judge Medina in an antitrust case when he observed the
methods used in processing papers in unrelated but parallel transactions. United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). But see Casebook, supra note 10, at 1296-98
(cases questioning propriety of judge's relying on personal knowledge).
Judges must be careful, however, to remain neutral. See generally Note, Lord's Justice:
One Judge's Battle to Expose the Deadly Dalkon Shield LU.D., 99 HARv. L. REV. 875
(1986).
80. On December 19, 1975, a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered thirteen
federal diversity actions transferred for pre-trial purposes to the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia. The cases were assigned to the Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. In re Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 405 F. Supp. 316, 319 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975). For back-
ground on this case, see Comment, The International Uranium Cartel: Litigation and Le-
gal Implications, 14 Tax. INT'L L.J. 59, 64 (1979).
81. This should be contrasted to the rules against the jury doing independent research.
See United States v. Duncan, 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979)
(juror reference to dictionary definitions of "motive" and "intent" was improper); see also
CASEBOOK, supra note 10, at 1299.
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sent evidence effectively, calling upon other experts as necessary,
and studying to obtain the understanding needed to maintain ef-
fective control.
III. CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM REMAINS UNSOLVED
It should be apparent that increasing judicial discretion in the
manner that I have suggested poses serious problems. Granting
summary judgment more liberally runs the risk of diluting the sev-
enth amendment's guarantee of a jury trial. Is there not something
just a little bit odd about giving judges, whose ignorance of matters
scientific is well known, 2 the final word on the value of expert
testimony?
Other proposals, such as those for stricter ethical standards for
experts, do not raise any constitutional problems, but only practi-
cal ones. How, for example, do you legislate ethics?
There is much room for reflection and debate. The bench and
bar are so heavily involved in day-to-day matters that sometimes
they do not fully appreciate what the problems are and how they
might be solved. Moreover, a tendentious quality is added to much
of the debate by those whose financial interests may be seriously
affected by substantial substantive or procedural changes. The
leadership in this area must be provided by the relatively impartial
law schools.
Despite all the difficulties we face in trying to deal with the
problem of expert witnesses, we appear to have at least one advan-
tage over some of our forebears: We now realize that we have
problems that are nearly intractable and that every reform proba-
bly creates new difficulties. This was apparently not always the
case. In 1811, a treatise writer had this to say about the testimony
of expert witnesses: "In proportion as experience and science ad-
vance, the uncertainty and danger from this kind of proof
diminishes." 83
While this attitude may have been appropriate in the age of en-
lightenment, it appears to us today-175 years and an explosion in
82. Cf. Koshland, The Basic Concepts of Science Elude the Decision-Makers, Newsday,
Dec. 12, 1985, at 94 ("Judges and legislators with little or no scientific training are making
sweeping decisions on risks to the environment and from nuclear war and industrial
accidents.").
83. L. MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 225 (*329) (1811)
(regarding medical doctors).
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expert knowledge later-to be somewhat naive. Whether we can
reduce the dangers from experts' proof I do not know. But would
not the teaching of evidence and our work in the courts be dull if
all the problems had been solved or were readily soluble?

